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Anne Gron 
The increasing role of risk management in corporate strategy can be seen in 
the development and use of new risk-management techniques. Two examples 
are the use of financial derivatives to manage interest rate exposure, foreign 
exchange risk, and commodity prices and the move away from insurance for 
managing commercial liability risks. One recent survey estimated that 65 per- 
cent of large, nonfinancial firms use derivatives to reduce risk exposure (Whar- 
ton School and Chase Manhattan Bank  1995).’ Meanwhile, the substitution 
of  such “nontraditional”  risk-management  practices  as self-insurance,  risk- 
retention groups, and captives for traditional insurance products has increased 
to an estimated 30-40  percent of the overall property-casualty insurance mar- 
ket and approximately 60-80  percent of  the large casualty risks, where the 
trend is concentrated? 
An increasing academic literature has followed the increasing importance 
of corporate risk management, but the motivations for corporate risk manage- 
ment are not, as yet, well understood. The empirical studies of corporate risk 
management in particular are relatively few and the results inconclusive. The 
theoretical incentives for corporate risk management fall into three broad cate- 
gories: reducing the cost of financial distress, reducing agency costs, and tax 
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1. Large firms are considered to be those with market value greater than $250 million. 
2. For further details on this trend, see Murphy (1995) and Johnson and Higgens (1992). 
23 24  AnneGron 
motivations. While existing empirical studies have found some evidence con- 
sistent with each of  these motivations, there is little consistency of  results 
across studies.3 This lack of consistency as well as data shortcomings indicate 
a need for further research on the topic. 
This study adds to the literature by examining the determinants of  insurer 
demand  for catastrophe reinsurance.  Reinsurance  refers  to  insurance  pur- 
chased by an insurer; catastrophe reinsurance is insurance for losses associ- 
ated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and windstorms. 
Catastrophe reinsurance is well suited for this study because it is relatively 
homogeneous and well defined. This ensures that one insurer’s catastrophe re- 
insurance is fairly similar to another insurer’s and allows us to calculate good 
measures of firm  exposure to risk, a feature lacking in studies of reinsurance 
more generally:  Also, unlike some financial engineering strategies, catastro- 
phe reinsurance cannot be used both to speculate and to hedge risk. Thus, this 
study focuses directly on the determinants of corporate demand for a specific 
form of risk reduction. 
Another advantage of this investigation is that the data include price as well 
as quantity measures. Previous studies either examine the quantity of  risk- 
reduction activity or, in some cases, investigate whether firms engage in partic- 
ular risk-management techniques. In both cases, the analysis is made without 
reference to cost because of data limitations. Ideally, one would like to examine 
the  quantity  of  risk  reduction  given  its  cost.  My  data  on  catastrophe- 
reinsurance contracts, from the largest broker of catastrophe reinsurance, Guy 
Carpenter and Company, include both price and quantity measures for a large 
fraction of the U.S. catastrophe-reinsurance market for the period  1987-93. 
This allows me to examine insurers’ willingness to trade off different quantity 
dimensions in response to changes in price. Since insurers are observed only if 
they purchase catastrophe reinsurance through Guy Carpenter, my estimation 
strategy corrects for sample selection. 
I find that insurers do trade off quantity and price when purchasing catastro- 
phe reinsurance: as prices increase, insurers increase retention levels, decrease 
total limits, and increase coinsurance rates. These findings support the notion 
3. The empirical literature on corporate risk management includes studies that estimate insurer 
use of reinsurance (Mayers and Smith  1990; Gwen 1994) and studies that examine corporate 
use of financial hedges (Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993; Gezcy, Minton, and Schrand 1997; 
Tufano 1996). 
4. As noted, reinsurance refers to an insurer buying insurance. This covers a wide range of 
financing and risk transfer. For example, diversification through swapping books of business be- 
tween insurers and contracts requiring reimbursement if  losses exceed a specified amount are 
both classified as reinsurance. Previous studies of  reinsurance cannot distinguish among such 
contractual differences and do not distinguish between reinsurance transactions in property lines 
of business (e.g., automobile physical damage) and those in liability lines (e.g., medical malprac- 
tice). In addition, the value of reinsurance purchased by the insurer is netted against the reinsurance 
sold, even though the two may be  very different types of transactions. The breadth of  activity 
covered under the term reinsurance makes it more difficult to construct a representative measure 
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that firms with greater probability of financial distress have greater demand for 
risk management and hence catastrophe reinsurance. The data also indicate 
that insurers with greater catastrophe exposure have significantly greater de- 
mand for catastrophe  reinsurance.  The data do not, however, indicate that 
smaller firms have greater demand for catastrophe reinsurance. In fact, I find 
that larger firms appear to have greater demand for catastrophe reinsurance. 
This finding suggests that the liquidity effect of catastrophe reinsurance domi- 
nates the solvency effect. Catastrophe reinsurance does two things: it decreases 
the probability of insolvency, and it increases liquidity after a large loss. Larger 
firms are likely to value the liquidity component more than smaller firms. My 
results suggest that the liquidity component dominates the solvency compo- 
nent in the data. 
The purchase of catastrophe reinsurance is also important in its own right. 
The issue of  funding catastrophic losses has come to the forefront in recent 
years with record catastrophe losses. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused $15 
billion of insured losses, and, from July 1989 to July 1996, the insurance indus- 
try paid out over $35 billion from events with over $1.5 billion in insured losses 
(see Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds 1996; and the sources therein). 
In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, prices for catastrophe reinsurance increased 
substantially, and availability declined. Studies suggest that exposure to catas- 
trophe has greatly increased owing to migration and building patterns that have 
increased population and property exposure in the most catastrophe-prone re- 
gions. One consequence of these changes has been an increased interest in 
securitizing  catastrophe  exposure via futures, options, or bonds.5 Reduced 
transactions costs and greater risk spreading are typically cited as the benefits 
derived from securitizing catastrophe risk. The results of this research suggest 
additional benefits. To the extent that insurers have lower leverage and hold 
more liquid assets as substitutes for catastrophe reinsurance, greater access to 
low-cost catastrophe reinsurance will free up insurer capital and reduce the 
need for liquidity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 examines the relevant theo- 
ries of corporate risk management and applies them to catastrophe reinsurance 
in particular. Section 1.2 presents the data, and section  1.3 reports the esti- 
mation results. A discussion of  the results and their implications for corporate 
risk management and the catastrophe-reinsurance market is contained in sec- 
tion 1.4. 
5. For example, trading in catastrophe-insurance options on the Chicago Board of Trade has 
increased steadily since the revised product was introduced in September  1995. October  1996 
trading showed open interest and notional value at their highest points. Another instrument for 
trading catastrophe risk, the Catastrophe Risk Exchange (CATEX), allows subscribers to swap 
risks or exchange risks for cash or risk plus cash. It had five subscribers as of November 1996. 
Several bond  issues linked to catastrophe exposure have also been considered. USAA plans to 
issue $500 million in catastrophe bonds, and the California Earthquake Authority may issue earth- 
quake bonds in March 1997 (see Chookaszian, chap. 11 in this volume). 26  AnneGron 
1.1  Corporate Risk Management and the Demand 
for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Catastrophe reinsurance is a contract whereby the reinsurer agrees to pay 
the insurer (purchaser) a specified amount in the event of a catastrophic event 
occurring within a defined time period causing large total property claims. The 
decisions to purchase insurance are motivated by the same basic forces that 
motivate other corporations to manage risk. The incentives for corporate risk 
management most relevant here fall into three categories: reducing the cost of 
financial distress, reducing agency costs, and tax motivations. Each of these is 
briefly described below. 
1.1.1 
Purchasing catastrophe reinsurance can reduce the probability of  financial 
distress and its associated costs by reducing the probability that the firm be- 
comes insolvent as the result of a catastrophe. Research demonstrates that the 
costs of financial distress include increased cost of  capital and reduced rela- 
tionship-specific investment by suppliers and purchasers (see, e.g., the discus- 
sions in Mayers and Smith 1982; Smith and Stulz 1985; and Mayers and Smith 
1990). These issues are particularly important for insurance companies where 
the product quality is inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy.6  In the 
presence of capital market imperfections that make internal funds less costly 
than external funds, firms in financial distress will tend to underinvest because 
of lack of internal funds (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993). This is likely 
to be particularly important in the insurance industry, where investment oppor- 
tunities follow large industry losses. As demonstrated in Gron (1994a, 1994b) 
and Winter (1988, 1994), these types of capital market imperfections are asso- 
ciated with increases in industry profitability following large industry losses. 
Firms with greater leverage and lower liquidity are likely to have greater costs 
of financial distress. 
Risk-averse individuals with large, undiversified stakes in a corporation will 
benefit from corporate risk management (Mayers and Smith 1982; Smith and 
Stulz 1985; Mayers and Smith 1990). This includes managers as well as own- 
ers when ownership is concentrated. The majority of insurance companies have 
one of two predominant ownership structures, stock or mutual. A substantial 
literature investigates the relative merits of  stock and mutual ownership and 
their continued coexistence in the insurance and banking industries.’ That liter- 
Motivations for Corporate Risk Management 
6. While smaller buyers of  insurance such as individuals and households may not be directly 
concerned with an insurer’s solvency because of state guaranty funds, insurer solvency is important 
to larger purchasers such as corporations whose claims are typically only partially covered by the 
guaranty system because the size of losses is likely to be above guaranty-fund limits. Increased 
probability of financial distress is likely to reduce an insurer’s financial rating, which may result 
in decreased demand from buyers, who use the ratings as a quality measure. 
7. Lamm-Tenant and Starks (1993) provide a good summary of this literature. 27  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
ature suggests that the presence of both organizational forms is related to two 
agency conflicts: that between owners and policyholders and that between 
owners and managers. The mutual form removes the first conflict but exacer- 
bates the second because there is no effective market for corporate control. 
Most of the theoretical literature implies that mutual insurers will tend to oper- 
ate in types of insurance with lower risk and managerial discretion, and Lamm- 
Tenant and Starks (1993) provide empirical evidence of this. The tendency of 
mutual insurers to take on less risk than stock insurers is likely to persist with 
respect to catastrophe exposures. Mutual insurers will be more likely to pur- 
chase catastrophe reinsurance than will stock insurers because the firm owners 
are less diversified and risk-averse managers will benefit from the risk reduc- 
tion. 
Mayers and Smith (1982, 1990) and Smith and Stulz (1985) point out that 
the progressivity of the tax code provides incentives for hedging since it creates 
a convex tax function for low levels of income. Therefore, a firm with expected 
income in the convex range of the tax code can reduce expected tax payments 
by reducing the variance of income. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the 
imposition of the alternative minimum tax, however, it has become quite dif- 
ficult  to  determine how  the  tax  code  influences  firm behavior.  Still, tax- 
preference items such as tax-loss carryforwards  will provide incentives to man- 
age risk since their expected present value is decreasing in the variance of 
income. 
The value of catastrophe reinsurance is also increasing in an insurer’s expo- 
sure to catastrophic risk. The greater the exposure, the greater the benefit from 
reinsurance. Greater exposure can come from concentration in  geographic 
areas where catastrophes are more common, such as coastal regions, or from 
concentration in property lines. 
1.1.2  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Insurers have several methods for hedging catastrophic risk. An insurer can 
enter into a proportional agreement with another insurer, it can buy “pro rata” 
coverage, which reimburses a fixed percentage of losses, or it can buy “excess- 
of-loss” coverage, which reimburses losses above a specified level. A propor- 
tional reinsurance treaty is a contract between insurers where each agrees to 
finance a stated percentage of claims from a particular book of business. Such 
an  arrangement is not aimed solely at reducing catastrophe risk, but it does 
so if  the two insurers operate in  separate geographic areas. If the insurer de- 
cides to purchase catastrophe coverage from a reinsurer, it can purchase either 
pro rata or excess-of-loss coverage. Pro rata coverage is typically purchased 
through a reinsurer that sells directly to insurers (a direct reinsurer), while 
excess-of-loss coverage is usually purchased from reinsurers that sell through 
brokers. The difference in the two approaches is in  amount of  coverage and 
access to reinsurers. Excess-of-loss programs purchased through a broker gen- 
erally have greater amounts of coverage. The broker works with the insurer to 28  AnneGron 
construct a reinsurance program and then uses its contacts with many rein- 
surers to place layers of this program with several different reinsurers. 
This paper investigates insurers’ demand for catastrophe reinsurance pur- 
chased through reinsurance brokers. The insurance is excess-of-loss coverage; 
a typical catastrophe-reinsurance program may call for $90 million coverage 
with a $10 million retention. The broker then “places” the program in the mar- 
ket, selling different “layers” of  the $90 million to reinsurers. For example, 
the contract might consist of five layers, each with its own retention and limit. 
The first layer covers the first $10 million after the insurer’s initial retention of 
$10 million, the second the next $15 million, the third the next $20 million, 
the fourth the next $20 million, and the fifth the final $25 million. Together, 
they add up to $90 million in coverage. In  addition to retention  and limit, 
catastrophe-reinsurance programs have coinsurance rates that specify the per- 
centage of the loss that the insurer will bear. If the coinsurance rate is 10 per- 
cent, then the insurer will pay  10 percent of any insured loss. In the example, 
a $50 million catastrophe will result in the reinsurers paying $36 million: 
0.9 *  $40  million  (= $50 million less $10 million retention). 
The amount of catastrophe reinsurance is increasing in the limit and decreasing 
in the retention and coinsurance rate. 
The price of a catastrophe-reinsurance program is quoted as the premium 
paid divided by the amount of coverage, called the rate on line. If the premium 
in the example given above is $13.175 million, the “price” will be 0.146 (= 
13.175/90). An insurer’s willingness to pay  for catastrophe reinsurance  de- 
pends, not on the absolute retention level and limit, but rather on the retention 
level and limit relative to the insurer’s exposure. The expected value of a partic- 
ular retention level or limit depends on the frequency with which the insurer 
expects losses in that range to occur. This will be a function of the insurer’s 
underlying property exposure. Therefore, the insurer demand for catastrophe 
reinsurance will be based on the retention level relative to the insurer’s expo- 
sure and the limit relative to exposure, or relative retention and relative limit, 
respectively. 
The demand  for catastrophe reinsurance  can be written  as equation  (l), 
where price (P)  is a function of  relative retention (RRET), the relative limit 
(RLIM), the coinsurance rate (COINS), and firm characteristics affecting the 
valuation of catastrophe reinsurance (Z): 
(1)  P,  =  Po +  P,RRET, +  P,RLIM,, +  P,COINS,, +  yZ, +  E~,. 
Since this is a demand curve, we expect the estimated coefficients on relative 
retention and coinsurance to be positive, while the estimated effect of relative 
limit should be negative. That is, insurers are expected to respond to higher 
price with higher retentions, greater coinsurance rates, and lower total limits. 
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clude factors that affect the costs of  financial distress, agency costs, and tax 
motivations as well as firm exposure to catastrophe loss. These variables are 
discussed in the next section, which describes the data. 
1.2  Data 
The price and quantity data come from Guy Carpenter, a reinsurance broker, 
and cover those insurers who purchased catastrophe reinsurance through the 
brokerage. These data were supplemented with data on insurance-company 
operations and financial status from the A. M. Best Company. Guy Carpenter’s 
data cover approximately 60 percent of the market for catastrophe reinsurance. 
Although the data include regional (smaller) companies and national (larger) 
companies, they are likely to be skewed toward larger companies for two rea- 
sons. First, many smaller companies purchase catastrophe reinsurance from a 
direct reinsurer or buy proportional reinsurance (or both). Second, Guy Car- 
penter has not traditionally served the majority of the smaller insurers who go 
to the broker market. 
The Guy Carpenter data analyzed here include all the regional and national 
companies  that  purchased  catastrophe reinsurance  through  Guy  Carpenter 
from 1987 to 1993. The typical data entry for a company includes the number 
of layers, the retention for each layer, the limit, the premium, and coinsurance. 
Since the insurer decides to purchase the whole catastrophe-reinsurance pro- 
gram at the same time, the data are aggregated to the program, the relevant 
unit of observation. For each company year I calculate the program price (rate 
on line), program retention, coverage limit, and coinsurance rate. Price, or rate 
on line, is the total premium paid divided by total limit. Coinsurance was calcu- 
lated as the average coinsurance rate for the contract.8 The data consist of 327 
observations covering fifty different insurers over the period 1987-93 .9 
To provide an overview of  catastrophe-insurance prices, figure 1.1 graphs 
average price for national and regional insurers for the period 1974-94.IO  Both 
series display the same relative minima and maxima. Prices are at relative max- 
ima in the middle of the  1970s and the  1980s, a feature common to many 
insurance-price or -profitability series. These periods coincide with the two 
most recent “insurance crises,” when industry prices and profitability increased 
rapidly, accompanied by sharp declines in availability. Other research suggests 
that these episodes are related to temporary capacity shortages that are in part 
due to capital market imperfections (see, e.g.,  Gron  1994a, 1994b; Winter 
1988, 1994; and the references therein). There is also a marked increase in 
8. The coinsurance rate reported in the data is not likely to be the actual coinsurance rate; it is, 
instead, the minimum coinsurance rate that the selling reinsurers required. The actual coinsurance 
rate is not available but could be greater, depending on market conditions. 
9. The actual estimation includes 298 observations, representing forty-five insurers. Observa- 
tions were lost because of missing characteristic data. 
10. The Guy Carpenter data do not include regional insurers until 1980. 30  AnneGron 
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Fig. 1.1  Average rate on line (price), national and regional, 197694 
price following 1992, when Hurricane Andrew produced record losses in Flor- 
ida and Louisiana. Froot and O'Connell (chap. 5 in this volume) provide evi- 
dence that price increases in catastrophe reinsurance are also associated with 
temporary capacity shortages that are due to capital market imperfections. 
Additional firm data for the years  1986-90  come from Best's Insurance 
Tapes and from Best's Insurance Reports."  Since I want firm  characteristics 
prior to the purchase of catastrophe reinsurance, these values are lagged so that 
the data cover the period 1987-93.  Firm exposure to catastrophe risk is mea- 
sured by two variables: the percentage of  premiums in property lines (PROP) 
and the percentage of  premiums that are in property lines in coastal areas 
(COAST).'* The relative retention and relative limit measures in the demand 
curve are measured as retention and limit divided by total property premiums 
just prior to purchase of the catastrophe-reinsurance program.I3 
11. Best's ratings and ownership structure are from Best's Insurance Reports. 
12. The lines of insurance included as property exposure are fire, allied, farmer's multiple peril, 
homeowner's multiple peril, commercial multiple peril, inland marine, earthquake, glass, and auto- 
mobile physical damage. Since the line of business data is at the national level, I assumed that that 
line's representation was the same at the state level as at the national level. Coastal property expo- 
sure is the sum of the property premium volume in the southern and eastern coastal states divided 
by total premium volume. The states included are Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, 
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Prop- 
erty premium in those states is total premium volume multiplied by the percentage of all premiums 
in the property lines. 
13. All firm characteristics (except default ratings) are from insurers' statutory reports and re- 
flect the status as of 31 December of that year. Firm characteristics are lagged one year and there- 
fore represent the experience for the year prior to the catastrophe-reinsurance program. Since prop- 
erty policies are generally in force for a year, this provides a good measure of expected exposure. 
Almost 60 percent of reinsurance contracts begin on 1 January. 31  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Other firm characteristics affect insurer demand through the probability of 
financial distress, agency costs, and tax motivations. Firm leverage (LEV), de- 
fault risk (BRate), size (SIZE), the percentage of  assets held in liquid assets 
(LIQ), diversification across lines of insurance (HHI), and geographic diversi- 
fication (NUM) affect the probability of financial distress. Leverage is the ratio 
of insurer liabilities (loss reserve plus loss adjustment expenses) divided by 
assets. Default risk is measured as Best’s rating, which varies from 13 (A+ +) 
to 1 (D). A rating of A+ + or A+ is rated as “superior,” while a rating of C or 
C-  is “marginal” and a rating of D “below minimum standards” (BestS Key 
Rating Guide, 1993). I expect insurers with greater leverage and lower finan- 
cial ratings to have a higher probability of financial distress. Insurer size, mea- 
sured as net assets, is likely to be associated with a lower probability of finan- 
cial distress, all else being equal, because the insurer has a greater ability to 
sustain a large loss. The liquidity measure is the percentage of assets held in 
liquid funds (the sum of short-term investments and cash on hand divided by 
net assets). Firms with greater liquidity are also less likely to suffer the costs 
of financial distress because they are more likely to have the required funds. 
Diversification across lines of insurance was measured as the sum of squared 
shares (a Hirschman-Herfindahl index). Geographic diversification was mea- 
sured as the number of  states in which the insurer sells insurance. I expect 
more diversified firms to have a lower probability of financial distress. 
Tax-preference items (TAX) and insurer ownership (MUT) measure the ef- 
fects of tax motivations and agency costs. I use federal taxes paid normalized 
by  net assets to control for tax motivations.14 Ownership is measured as an 
indicator variable that is one if the company is a mutual. 
Table 1.1 reports the mean rate on line, relative retention, and relative limit 
by  year for the companies in the sample, divided by whether the company is 
classified as national or regional. While there is substantial difference in the 
level of these variables between the two groups, the series behave quite simi- 
larly over time.I5  National insurers have lower relative retention and lower rela- 
tive limits, on average, than smaller, regional insurers. The average price (pre- 
mium  divided  by  limit)  is  higher  for national  than  for  regional  insurers, 
reflecting their greater exposure to catastrophe. Table 1.2  provides a summary 
of insurer characteristics for the insurers purchasing catastrophe reinsurance. 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 provide comparison for insurers with positive property ex- 
posure as calculated from the Best data.16 Companies in the sample of catastro- 
phe-reinsurance purchasers are larger, on average, than other insurance firms, 
14. Negative federal taxes paid on the cash-flow statement indicate taxes paid; positive amounts 
indicate a net operating loss carryback. A value of zero is consistent with a tax-loss carryforward. 
15. The exception is relative retention. The correlation between the national and the regional 
annual means is above 60 percent for all series except relative retention, which is negatively corre- 
latedat -.18. 
16. Since the catastrophe-reinsurance  purchase is typically done for the whole insurance group, 
affiliated companies were dropped. The data include group ad  unaffiliated companies only. Table 1.1  Annual Averages: Price and Quantity Measures by Insurer Type 
Price (Rate on Line)  Relative Retention  Relative Limit  Coinsurance 
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Table 1.2  Summary Statistics of Insurer Data: Guy Carpenter Data 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
SIZE  302  4,280,000,000  470,000,000  1,857,248  24,700,000,000 
PROP  302  ,653  .267  ,143  .999 
TAX  302  -  .007  ,015  -  .062  ,037 
HHI  302  ,285  ,143  ,110  ,818 
COAST  302  ,378  ,341  0  ,997 
LEV  302  ,374  .195  .O 1  85  ,707 
LIQ  302  .093  ,086  -  ,0060  ,599 
RRET  302  .0395  .026  .0034  ,174 
RLIM  302  ,586  .525  ,025  1.921 
COINS  302  ,047  ,024  0  .15 
REGL  302  ,593  .492  0  1 
BRate  298  10.960  1.465  3  13 
NUM  302  23.815  23.205  1  51 
YEAR  302  89.944  1.993  87  93 
Table 1.3  Summary Statistics of Insurer Data: Full Sample 
~  ~~  ________ 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
GC  sample  4,293  ,070  ,256  0  1 
Gc  plus  4,293  .084  .277  0  1 
SIZE  4,293  671,000,000  2,730,000,000  143,157  51,000,000,000 
PROP  4,293  .587  ,302  1.23E-05  1.178 
TAX  4,293  -.0107  ,024  -.417  ,339 
HHI  4,293  ,415  ,223  ,102  1.807 
COAST  4,293  .245  ,313  0  1.137 
LEV  4,293  ,312  ,187  4.5E-05  1.062 
LIQ  4,293  ,195  ,208  -  ,036  1.315 
NUM  4,293  15.242  18.794  0  51 
YEAR  4,293  89.721  1.722  87  93 
Note:  GC = Guy Carpenter. 
although the sample does include some relatively small companies. The pur- 
chasing sample also has slightly greater property and coastal exposure, a lower 
proportion of  liquid assets, and slightly greater leverage. The Guy Carpenter 
sample is also slightly less concentrated across lines of business and, on aver- 
age, licensed to write in eight more states. 
1.3  Estimation 
Before estimating equation (I), we need to deal with two estimation prob- 
lems: sample selection and endogenous quantity measures. The first problem 
arises because the distribution of price in equation (1) is not observed for all 34  AnneGron 







































































Nore; GC = Guy Carpenter. 
insurers; instead, there is incidental truncation.l’ Estimating equation (1) with- 
out correction for incidental truncation is similar to calculating the mean of a 
normal distribution from a variable that is observed only if its value is above 
some threshold. In order to estimate the mean of  the full distribution from a 
truncated variable, I include a correction factor for the truncation.l8 
The problem here is slightly different in that the truncation is not on price 
but on the valuation of  catastrophe reinsurance. I  observe a purchase (and 
therefore a price) only if the unobserved net value of catastrophe reinsurance 
is above zero. While I do not observe the net value of catastrophe reinsurance, 
I do observe the decision to purchase catastrophe reinsurance. The standard 
correction technique for this problem is to estimate a selection equation and 
include an estimated correction factor, known as the inverse Mills ratio or haz- 
ard rate, in the estimation. If  V* is the net value of catastrophe reinsurance and 
V is one if the insurer purchases and zero otherwise, then the underlying model 
can be written as 
V$ =  so +  SIW,  + 
A two-step estimation procedure where the first stage estimates the probability 
of purchase as suggested by Heckman (1979) is appropriate (see Greene 1993). 
The first stage uses a probit specification to estimate the probability of pur- 
chase: 
prob(v,  =  1)  =  @(So +  s,W,,), 
17. For further discussion, see Greene (1993) and Maddala (1983). 
18. For example, if the variable z  is distributed normally with parameters (p,  a’)  and we observe 
z  only if z >  a,  then E(zlz >  a)  = I*. + IJ+(cY)/[~  -  @(a)],  where CY  = (a -  k)/u.  The second term 
corrects for the truncation, where +(.)  is the standard normal probability density function, and 
@(.)  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 35  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Table 1.5  Summary Statistics of Insurer Data: Guy Carpenter Plus 
Additional Insurers 
~~~  ~  ~  ~ 
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359  -  ,0076 
359  .295 
359  ,364 
359  ,385 
359  .097 
359  24.529 


































Nore: GC = Guy Carpenter. 
and 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients, 6, are used to construct the 
inverse Mills ratio, +(6w)/@(6w), and included in the estimation of equation 
(1). In this correction factor, +(.) is the standard normal probability density 
function, and @(a)  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
There is one additional caveat in this case: I observe purchases  only for 
insurers with positive net value that purchase through the particular broker. In 
the sample selection equation, some of the firms that actually purchase catas- 
trophe reinsurance will be misclassified as firms that do not. To partially cor- 
rect for this, I augmented the data by searching annual reports on the Lexis- 
Nexis on-line service for insurers reporting catastrophe-reinsurance purchases. 
This yielded an additional fifty-seven (insurer-year) purchases that could be 
matched to the insurer data. (Sample statistics for this larger set of purchasers 
are reported in table 1.5.) I estimate equation (1) using correction factors gen- 
erated from both samples. 
Table 1.6 reports the results from estimation of the sample selection equa- 
tion with buyers defined as only Guy Carpenter insurers in columns l and 2 
and as both Guy Carpenter insurers and those reporting in their annual reports 
in columns 4 and 5. Columns 3 and 6 report the change in the probability 
of  purchase, given a small change in the independent variable (evaluated at 
sample means). The results are qualitatively similar for both dependent vari- 
ables, with the magnitude of a change in the independent variable slightly 
larger for estimation using the larger set of reinsurance purchasers. Somewhat 
contrary to theoretical predictions, but consistent with the institutional facts, 
large insurers are substantially more likely to purchase catastrophe reinsurance 
than smaller insurers are. Greater exposure to catastrophic losses, as measured 36  AnneGron 
Table 1.6  Estimation of Sample Selection Equation 
Dependent Variable"  Dependent Variableb 
Change in  Change in 
Coefficient  z-Statistic  Probability  Coefficient  z-Statistic  Probability 











9.528- 11  13.37  4.82E-12 
2.004  8.45  .I01 
-  1.725  -7.36  -  ,087 
.208  .I2  ,011 
-1.513  -4.90  -.077 
1.683  5.92  ,085 
.556  5.22  ,028 
-2.906  -12.44 
5,105 
-872.24 
8.29E- 11  11.99  6.67E-  12 
1.590  8.23  ,128 
-  1.294  -6.84  -.lo4 
-  1.843  -1.15  -.148 
-  1.329  -5.25  -.lo7 
2.009  8.09  ,162 
,565  5.64  ,045 
-2.756  -  14.  I I 
5,105 
-  1,068.95 
*One if insurer in Guy Carpenter data. 
if insurer in Guy Carpenter or additional data. 
by the proportion of business in property lines and the proportion of premiums 
written for property exposures in coastal states, also substantially increases the 
probability of purchase. Contrary to expectations, firms with greater concen- 
tration by line of business are less likely to purchase catastrophe reinsurance. 
The estimated effects of the proportion of liquid assets and firm leverage are 
statistically significant and have the expected effect on the probability of pur- 
chase. The estimated effect of  tax-loss carryforwards, as proxied by  federal 
taxes paid, is not significantly different from zero and varies in  sign across 
specifications. 
A second estimation problem arises from the endogeneity of quantity mea- 
sures. The usual estimation strategy for a demand curve would be to specify a 
reinsurance supply curve for the individual insurer and use the excluded vari- 
ables in the supply curve to identify the demand curve. One particular problem 
in this case is that measurable factors that shift the demand for reinsurance will 
generally shift the supply of reinsurance as well. One variable that might affect 
the supply curve is the level of  coverage. As noted by  Smith and Doherty 
(1993), insurance markets generally become less competitive when the level 
of coverage is very high. Therefore, one instrument is the upper limit of  the 
program, calculated as the sum of the limit and retention. 
One possible source of  instruments ccmes from the cross-sectional nature 
of the data. Relative retention, relative limits, and coinsurance rates are likely 
to  be  correlated across insurers owing to  responses to  supply conditions. 
Therefore, relative retention, relative limit, and coinsurance averaged over all 
other insurers for the year might produce acceptable instruments for estimating 
equation (1). The important assumption is that similarities reflect catastrophe- 
reinsurance supply conditions that all insurers face. I make this assumption in 37  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Table 1.7  Estimation of Catastrophe Reinsurance Demand 














Inverse Mill's ratio 
-.I61 
(- ,138) 






-  ,786 
( -  3.190) 
,329 
(3.493) 





(2.6  15) 
-1.171 
(-3.168) 
-  ,276 
(-339) 









































































(- 1 524) 












Nore: Column A gives OLS estimation; column B gives instrumental variables (N)  estimation; 
column C gives IV with Mill's ratio based on the Guy Carpenter sample; and column D gives N 
with Mill's ratio based on the augmented Guy Carpenter sample. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of price, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Each regression has 298 
observations and includes a constant term. 
"The inverse Mill's ratio was not included in the estimation. 
estimating equation (1) and provide OLS results to compare with the instru- 
mental variables results. 
Table 1.7 presents the results from estimation of equation (1). The logarithm 
of price was regressed on the explanatory variables because of its skewed dis- 
tribution. Column A presents the results from OLS estimation, excluding the 
inverse Mills ratio. Column B displays results from instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation of  equation 1, again excluding the Mills ratio. The estimated co- 
efficients in columns C and D include two different measures of the inverse 
Mills ratio; the first is based on the selection equation classifying only Guy 
Carpenter insurers as purchasers, the second on the selection equation with the 
broader set of purchasing insurers. 38  AnneGron 
The simple, OLS regression of price on quantity measures and firm charac- 
teristics does not perform particularly well. While the estimated effect of the 
relative limit is negative and the estimated effect of coinsurance is positive, as 
expected, the latter is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The 
estimated effect of relative retention is not different from zero. In addition, 
property  exposure  and leverage  are statistically  significant with  the wrong 
signs. From the results in columns B-D,  one sees that the coefficients on rela- 
tive retention and coinsurance increase substantially (in magnitude and statisti- 
cal significance) using instrumental variables, as one might expect if  supply 
and demand effects were confounded in column A. The estimated effect of 
relative limit, however, decreases slightly in magnitude and remains negative 
but is not statistically different from zero. Estimation using instrumental vari- 
ables causes the estimated coefficients on property exposure and leverage to 
be statistically insignificant. In addition, the estimated effects of diversification 
across lines is now negative and statistically different from zero. 
Inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in columns C and D improves the perfor- 
mance of the firm characteristics without substantially changing the estimated 
effects of  the endogenous variables. In column C, the inverse Mills ratio is 
based on the Guy Carpenter data only, whereas, in column D, additional obser- 
vations of catastrophe-reinsurance purchases are included. The results in both 
columns are quite similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The exception 
is the tax variable, which was also significantly different across specifications 
in table 1.6. The coefficient on the inverse Mill's  ratio, correcting for sample 
selection, is positive and statistically significant, confirming the expected posi- 
tive selection bias. Insurers with greater valuation of catastrophe reinsurance 
are more likely to be in our sample. 
Increasing catastrophe exposure increases the demand for catastrophe rein- 
surance, as seen from the estimated effect of property and coastal exposure. 
Insurers with a higher probability of financial distress-those  with higher le- 
verage and lower Best's ratings-have  a greater demand for catastrophe rein- 
surance as well. Insurers with a greater proportion of liquid assets have a lower 
demand for catastrophe reinsurance, also consistent with expectations. The es- 
timated effect of insurer size is positive and statistically significant as well. 
Insurers writing in more states have a greater willingness to pay for catastrophe 
reinsurance,  although the estimated effect is not statistically different from 
zero. The estimated coefficient of being a regional insurer is negative. This is 
contrary to the expected effect if these variables are measuring geographic 
diversification. The indicator variable for ownership structure (mutual or stock) 
was not included in the estimation because the variable was highly collinear 
with the regional indicator ~ariab1e.l~ 
Table 1.8 presents estimates of equation (1) with the default variable enter- 
19. All but one of the mutual insurers are regional, and all but one of the regional insurers 
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Table 1.8  Estimation of Catastrophe Reinsurance Demand with Categorical 
Default Variable 
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BRate 10or 11 
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~  ,227 
(- ,268) 
1.73  1 
(2.486) 






Note: Column A gives instrumental variables (IV) with Mill's ratio based on the Guy Carpenter 
sample, and column B gives IV with Mill's ratio based on the augmented Guy Carpenter sample. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of price, and ?-statistics are presented in parenthe- 
ses. Each regression has 298 observations and includes a constant term. 
ing as discrete categories rather than as a continuous variable. Four categories 
are included: rating of B or below, rating of B+ or B++, rating of A-  or A, 
and rating of A+ or A+ + (the excluded category). Insurers with lower ratings 
have significantly greater demand for catastrophe reinsurance, and the insurers 
with the lowest ratings have the highest demand, but there is no statistical dif- 
ference between insurers in the two highest categories. The estimated effects 
of the other variables are qualitatively similar to those in columns C and D of 
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Table 1.9  Estimation of Catastrophe Reinsurance Demand with Year and 
Firm Effects 
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Nore: Column A gives instrumental variables (IV) with Mill's  ratio based on the Guy Carpenter 
sample with year fixed effects; column B gives IV with Mill's  ratio based on the augmented Guy 
Carpenter sample with year fixed effects; column C gives IV with Mill's  ratio based on the Guy 
Carpenter sample with firm  fixed effects; and column D gives IV with Mill's ratio based on the 
augmented Guy Carpenter sample with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of price, and r-statistics are presented in parentheses. Each regression has 298 observa- 
tions and includes a constant term. 
Table 1.9 investigates the robustness of the results when I control for year 
and firm effects. The results in columns A and B include year effects, those in 
columns C and D firm fixed effects. In contrast to the earlier results, the esti- 
mated effect of relative retention and coinsurance is not statistically different 
from zero when year fixed effects are added. The estimated effect of relative 
limit, however, is now statistically different from zero, although the estimated 41  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
coefficient does not change as much as those of the other two quantity mea- 
sures. This suggests that the time-series variation in the data is important for 
estimating the effects of  relative retentions and coinsurance. The estimated 
coefficients for the other variables are generally much smaller in magnitude, 
but the qualitative results are largely similar to those in tables 1.8 and 1.9. 
Columns C and D in table 1.9 report results including firm fixed effects. In 
this specification, all three quantity variables have the expected sign and are 
statistically different from zero. The magnitudes of the estimated effects of 
relative retention and coinsurance lie between those reported in columns A and 
B of  tables  1.7 and  1.8, while the estimated effect of  relative limit is much 
greater than in other specifications. The qualitative effects of the insurer char- 
acteristics are generally similar to those found in tables 1.7  and 1.8. One excep- 
tion is the default variable, which is now statistically insignificant. Including 
both year and firm fixed effects (not reported) yields results similar to those of 
columns A and B in table 1.9. 
1.4  Discussion 
Although the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients vary across specifi- 
cations, several interesting and robust findings emerge. Insurers with a greater 
probability of financial distress, as measured by higher leverage, lower liquid- 
ity, and lower ratings, have a greater willingness to pay for catastrophe reinsur- 
ance. Insurers with greater catastrophe exposure also have a higher demand for 
catastrophe  reinsurance.  Other results  are more surprising.  Larger  insurers 
have a greater demand for catastrophe reinsurance. Demand by regional insur- 
ers was not statistically different from that of national insurers. 
These results are less surprising if one considers the components of a catas- 
trophe reinsurance contract in banking terms.*O Each contract can be thought 
of as having two components: it creates a contingent liability that increases the 
probability that the firm remains solvent, and it acts like a loan commitment to 
provide liquidity. As argued earlier, larger insurers are less likely to become in- 
solvent and so will value the contingent liability less than smaller insurers will. 
However, the loan commitment has value only for solvent firms that lack 
liquidity. Larger insurers are less likely to be insolvent and therefore are more 
likely to be solvent but illiquid following a large loss. Larger firms value the 
liquidity component more than smaller firms. Therefore, the expected effect of 
insurer size is indeterminant. The results are consistent with liquidity effects 
dominating solvency effects in these data. 
The specification of equation (1) is particularly important for the estimated 
quantity effects and tax effects. In specifications without time effects, relative 
retention and coinsurance had the expected, positive effects. In specifications 
with time effects, relative limit had the expected, negative effect, but the other 
20. I am grateful to Raghu Rajan for this insight. 42  AnneGron 
two quantity measures were statistically insignificant. The estimated effect of 
the tax variable appears to be very sensitive to the specification of the sample 
selection correction. The inconsistent performance of  this variable may  well 
come from its high correlation with firm profits, which are likely to be endoge- 
nous to other firm decisions. 
This study complements other recent investigations of corporate risk man- 
agement. Two of these, Mayers and Smith (1990) and Garven (1994), focus on 
insurers’ use of reinsurance. Mayers and Smith (1990) find that the quantity of 
reinsurance used is increasing in the concentration across lines of ownership, 
increasing in default risk, decreasing in insurer size, and decreasing in concen- 
tration across lines of insurance and geographically. Garven (  1994) extends the 
work of Mayers and Smith and relates the quantity of reinsurance to measures 
of investment and claims risk. The riskiness of investment returns is negatively 
related to the amount of reinsurance used, while geographic concentration and 
line-of-business  concentration  have  similar  estimated  effects  as in  Mayers 
and Smith. 
Three other studies-Nance,  Smith, and Smithson (1993), Gezcy, Minton, 
and Schrand (1997), and Tufano (1996)-examine  the use of hedging instru- 
ments in industries other than insurance. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) 
and Gezcy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) examine the determinants of deriva- 
tive use. These investigations are quite similar to the sample selection esti- 
mation presented in table 1.3 above. Both studies conclude that hedging with 
financial derivatives is more likely for firms with greater costs of financial dis- 
tress (measured by low liquidity) and larger firms. Nance, Smith, and Smithson 
find evidence for tax motivations, while Gezcy, Minton, and Schrand find that 
firms  with  greater  risk  exposure  and  those  that  use  other  financial  risk- 
management tools are more likely to use particular financial derivatives. Tu- 
fano (1996) finds that the managerial incentive measures are the major factor 
explaining the differences in risk management among the gold-mining firms 
in his study. 
This study differs from previous studies in  several important dimensions. 
The data include the cost of risk management as well the quantity. Unlike other 
studies of reinsurance more generally, this study allows us to generate better 
measures of exposure to risk since it examines catastrophe reinsurance spe- 
cifically. Also, catastrophe reinsurance can be used only to hedge risk, unlike 
financial derivatives, which can be used to speculate. Like previous studies, 
this study shows that insurers with a higher probability of  financial distress 
have greater demand for risk-management activities; however, I find that lever- 
age as well as liquidity is important. I also find that larger insurers are more 
likely to purchase catastrophe reinsurance and have greater demand. This con- 
trasts somewhat with previous research that finds that larger firms are more 
likely to employ financial derivatives or that smaller insurers purchase more 
reinsurance. Even after controlling for the fact that larger firms are more likely 
to purchase, larger firms still have greater demand for catastrophe reinsurance. 43  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
The findings indicate several directions for future research. Taken together 
with the results of previous  studies, they show that the costs of financial dis- 
tress are important determinants of  corporate risk management but that the 
firm characteristics that best measure the costs of  financial distress may vary 
across industries. For example, in this study, leverage and liquidity were asso- 
ciated with costs of  financial distress, while, in Gezcy, Minton, and Schrand 
(1  997), liquidity and research-and-development expenditures were particularly 
important. Further research investigating corporate risk management should be 
careful to allow for industry-specific effects of  firm characteristics. 
Further investigation into the liquidity and solvency components of  insur- 
ance is also warranted. Are similar effects observed in other types of reinsur- 
ance, and do corporate purchasers of  insurance exhibit similar behavior?  It 
may be that the liquidity component dominates the solvency component for 
some, but not all, types of insurance and reinsurance. For types of insurance 
where the liquidity component is particularly important for large firms, finan- 
cial products providing lines of credit may be reasonable substitutes for insur- 
ance. With respect to the alternative financing structures proposed for catastro- 
phe risks, these findings suggest that risk financing may be as important, if not 
more important, than risk transfer for larger insurers. Indeed, large insurers are 
pursuing alternative financing instruments that provide financing at the time of 
a large catastrophe without risk transfer. For example, Nationwide Mutual and 
Morgan Guaranty have established an agreement whereby Nationwide can is- 
sue up to $400 million in debt instruments (called surplus notes) to a guaran- 
teed buyer (see Chookaszian, chap. 11 in this volume). 
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Comment  Steven F. Goldberg 
When I was asked to comment on Anne Gron’s paper, my first inclination was 
to pull a Nancy Reagan and just say no. My presence at the conference was 
intended to be a one-way street: I would absorb all the academic raw intelli- 
gence on this subject and maybe in the process seek double or even triple credit 
for my actuarial continuing education. 
I became chief actuary at USAA in 1989. That year turned out to be a major 
turning point for me and the industry. Prior to Humcane Hugo in that year, the 
insurance industry had never suffered a loss of over $1 billion from any single 
disaster. Since that time, we have had ten disasters that exceeded that amount. 
As you might imagine, my watch has been dominated by this problem. 
Catastrophes, of course, present a significant challenge to the U.S. economy 
Steven F. Goldberg is senior vice president, chief property and casualty actuary, for USAA P&C 
Co. in San Antonio. He is a fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a member of the American 
Academy of Actuaries, and a chartered property and casualty underwriter. 45  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
and to the U.S. property-casualty-insurance industry, posing financial solvency, 
capital accumulation, and insurance-availability  issues. One of  the principal 
tools used by insurers has been catastrophe reinsurance, but recent events have 
brought about many changes in demand for this product. 
I am glad to see that the academic community is beginning to focus on these 
issues. I welcome Anne’s paper and the others to be presented here in the next 
few days. I have to admit that the subject of Anne’s paper was appealing to 
me. Having been part of  the real demand for catastrophe reinsurance, I was 
wondering how this process could possibly be treated in an academic setting. 
My personal view was that this market functioned in such a way that willing 
buyers would meet up with willing sellers in an environment that would have 
made Adam Smith proud. But, in 1992, following Hurricane Andrew, willing 
buyers became desperate buyers, while willing sellers vanished. Today, some 
of the old willing sellers have reappeared, a bit sobered. But, now, new willing 
sellers from an odd island known for a famous triangle have entered the picture 
as the invisible hand of competition once again seeks an  equilibrium. 
Those of us who are willing buyers are not fully satisfied with today’s willing 
sellers. They just are not able to sell enough of the product at the full range of 
the buyers’ needs. Thus, many of the buyers long for an additional source of 
sellers who can add more product at levels where the current sellers choose 
not to. Once again, it all follows the natural law that we call economics. 
Anne’s paper was quite interesting because she was able to assert conclu- 
sions empirically that those of us who are so-called practitioners observe anec- 
dotally. I have chosen to accept the statistical methodology in Anne’s paper at 
face value and leave to others the task of critiquing this aspect. I will note that 
there are a few practical areas that may bear some further analysis. 
First, the data were derived from the period  1987-93.  That is a little like 
examining the stock market from 1925 to 1930; it’s a pretty mixed bag. The 
earlier part of the period was dominated by a paradigm of denial in the market- 
place that went  something like this:  Since large catastrophes did not occur 
recently, they will never occur at all. I am not sure when we will be able to 
analyze this kind of data to find a typical  pattern  because this presupposes 
some sort of steady state. 
Second, at the beginning of her paper, Anne asserts that not all insurers find 
it desirable to purchase catastrophe reinsurance that results in more accurate 
estimation. I think that, when we examine more closely why all insurers do 
not find it desirable to purchase catastrophe reinsurance, we find a circularity 
problem. That is, the very largest insurers need so much catastrophe reinsur- 
ance that their entry into the market itself substantially affects the demand. I 
have no idea how to adjust for that. 
Finally, I fully agree with Anne when  she says that insurers do trade off 
quantity and price when  purchasing catastrophe reinsurance, that, as prices 
increase, insurers increase retention levels, decrease total limits, and increase 
coinsurance rates. 
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ance tends to be  a bit  simplistic, but it does agree with Anne’s findings. A 
personal analogy would be my decision on purchasing my own car insurance. 
My personal equivalent of the market effect of Hurricane Andrew was last year 
when my  son first got his driver’s license. I always liked car insurance as a 
product (primarily because it was one product that I thought I understood). It 
protected my investment in my automobile and the obligation owed to society 
for my negligence in operating this automobile. I decided how much coverage 
to buy on the basis of an internal budget of about what I thought it would cost. 
Then came the shock of the sixteen-year-old male. All of a sudden, the demand 
for my insurance increased, but the price increased even more. I reevaluated 
what I wanted to pay for and thus increased my deductibles to the base level 
of pain. In other words, I had greater probability of financial distress and thus 
greater demand for insurance. I  surely had greater personal catastrophe ex- 
posure. 
While it may seem very crude, I approach the reinsurance buying decision 
in much the same way I approach my own personal insurance buying decision. 
What I need is a function of what I can afford, which is a function of what it 
costs. How high my retention is depends on how much pain I am willing to 
endure and what  I am willing to pay.  I may even be willing to change the 
original risk by increasing the risk that original policyholders take on them- 
selves in highly risk-prone areas. 
I do not want to suggest that these multimillion-dollar decisions are made 
frivolously. There is a lot more going on than I have suggested. In the case of 
USAA, we carefully examine our risk as modeled by the very best scientists, 
whom we employ as consultants through risk-modeling firms. We look at the 
wholesale cost of our reinsurance as if we were selling it to ourselves. Then 
we look at what the market is selling it for and make the best business decision 
under these circumstances. Sometimes, the price we choose to target governs 
the amount of  capacity that we will achieve in the global marketplace. Our 
overall financial position and tax status go into making these final determina- 
tions. These decisions are important enough that our board of directors is fre- 
quently briefed about them. 
I want to emphasize here some of the practical  issues that may apply only 
to USAA’s unique market. What we cannot do at USAA is walk away from our 
members. Our corporate mission obligates us to find a way to serve our mem- 
bers wherever  they are. The level of  service will have to be a function of a 
trade-off between the needs of individual members and the needs of the mem- 
bership. 
A critical new element is how to calculate the allocation of the cost of rein- 
surance to pass through to the ultimate consumer. This is a new dimension in 
the actuarial pricing equation because of the scale of the costs in the market. 
We want to charge only those members who are offered protection the ultimate 
cost of catastrophe reinsurance. Members with  no such risk should not pay 
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As a result of the sacred bond that we have with our members, we are going 
to work especially hard to find ways to provide this coverage fairly. Walking 
away from long-term commitments is the easy way  out. The hard road is to 
hang in there, build up capital, seek additional sources of capacity, and thereby 
avoid the government inefficiently seizing another consumer need. I think that 
our industry would be in better condition in the long run if others were able to 
manage in a similar manner. 
Insurers should be encouraged to engage in prudent risk-management be- 
havior. We believe that one additional method of encouraging prudent risk be- 
havior is to permit insurers to establish tax-deductible reserves for future catas- 
trophes. Current tax laws and accounting principles discourage U.S. insurers 
from accumulating assets specifically to pay for future catastrophe losses. In- 
stead, payments for catastrophe losses are made from unrestricted policyholder 
surplus after the losses are incurred.  Because of their domestic tax laws and 
accounting principles,  some non-U.S. insurers are able to deduct reserves for 
future catastrophes free of tax. That ability gives those  non-U.S.  insurers a 
competitive  advantage over U.S. insurers, enabling them to attract insurance 
and reinsurance business that would  otherwise be written  by  U.S.  insurers. 
Such a change in the U.S. tax approach would complement, not diminish, ex- 
isting risk-management methods like catastrophe reinsurance. 
There is another important factor to consider in reinsurance demand. Look- 
ing back, the insurance industry is partially to blame for today’s demand for 
original insurance in risk-prone areas. We unrealistically led consumers to be- 
lieve that the cost of being in harm’s way was very cheap. Now, their demand 
is high, but, while the supply of capacity is increasing, it cannot meet the full 
demand. 
What will inevitably happen is that an equilibrium will be approached that 
will allow for adequate rates for the true risk. Rigid rate regulation can slow 
this  process, but  the  underlying economics forces  an eventual equilibrium. 
This will surely involve a change in the original risk in highly  catastrophe- 
prone areas to include greater risk retention and improved damageability. 
As an industry, we cannot look at this problem as one that is solely in the 
province of actuaries, accountants, and finance professors. A good part of the 
problem of demand for insurance and therefore reinsurance is a function of the 
physical  quality of  risks to withstand the natural  hazards to which they are 
exposed. A group known today as the Insurance Institute for Property Loss 
Reduction has been formed and is now reinvigorated to address the physical 
aspects of the risk problem. 
As I wrap up, I admit that I drifted away from a direct response to Anne’s 
paper quite often. In my own defense, I wanted to make sure that the academic 
community gathered here understands that we practitioners need your creativ- 
ity to address the many facets of this complex societal problem. I want to thank 
Anne for  an interesting approach to measuring demand for catastrophe re- 
insurance. 48  Anne Gron 
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This is a very nice, careful, paper that uncovers some interesting regularities 
about who buys catastrophe reinsurance. Since Anne has addressed most of my 
comments on an earlier draft, I will confine myself to interpreting the results. 
I want to focus on two important theoretical reasons for buying reinsurance. 
The first is to assure potential policyholders that the insurer will be solvent in 
case of  disaster and will be able to make good on claims. Here, reinsurance 
provides contingent capital to the insurer. With contingent capital, the same 
pool of capital sitting in a remote island can reinsure very diverse and, hence, 
uncorrelated risks around the world. By contrast, when capital is committed to 
an insurer via an equity infusion, the diversification possibilities are limited to 
the insurer’s area of business. So contingent capital is cheaper. Another way of 
saying this is that the purpose of insurance is to produce confidence. With its 
access to the distribution systems of multiple insurers, the reinsurer can pro- 
duce more confidence per dollar of capital than can a local insurer. 
Of  course, capital committed to an insurer can become contingent if the 
insurer enters into loss-sharing agreements with other distant insurers or if the 
insurer writes reinsurance contracts for others. In other words, a poorly capital- 
ized, poorly diversified firm should have a high demand for buying reinsur- 
ance, while a well-capitalized, poorly diversified firm should sell a lot of re- 
insurance. 
The paper provides some evidence consistent with at least part of this argu- 
ment. It shows that low-rated and highly indebted insurers have a higher de- 
mand for reinsurance. However, it also shows that regional firms do not pay a 
higher price for reinsurance than national firms even though the benefits of 
contingent capital are probably the highest for the regional firms. Furthermore, 
larger firms pay  more for reinsurance.  It may  be that we are seeing supply 
effects rather than demand effects here. Alternatively, small and regional firms 
may be better capitalized and make some of their capital contingent by effec- 
tively selling reinsurance.’ 
Before turning to the second role of reinsurance on which I think this paper 
sheds light, it is useful to ask the following question: If global diversification 
is so important, why do we not see more insurance companies across the world 
merging and displacing the need for reinsurers? While we see some trends in 
this direction, the political and tax barriers to such global companies may be 
high. But I also think that, for a reinsurer, being at arm’s length from the insurer 
provides a degree of  certification and credibility that a global insurer cannot 
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1. It is also possible that the very small, undiversified insurers may be playing high-risk strate- 
gies where they make money for their stockholders at the expense of  their core, unsophisticated 
policyholders by taking on more risk. This would show up as a lower demand for reinsurance. 49  Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance 
provide. Every time an insurer buys reinsurance, the rating agencies, and con- 
sequently the customers, get the comfort that an independent third party has 
evaluated the insurer. When such transactions are brought in house, as with a 
global insurer, third-party certification is lost. 
The second role that reinsurance plays is to provide the insurer with liquid 
funds when disaster strikes. The insurer may, in fact, be quite solvent, so the 
point of reinsurance here is not to provide assurance through contingent capi- 
tal. Instead, reinsurance reduces the need for the insurer to raise capital at an 
unfavorable time, at potentially very unfavorable rates. Immediately after a ca- 
tastrophe, financial markets may be very uncertain  about how much loss an 
insurer has sustained. At that very moment, the insurer will need funds to pay 
policyholders. The issuance of equity to raise finance at that point would be 
viewed  very  negatively  by  the  market.  By  securing  contingent  financing 
through reinsurance, the insurer alleviates potential liquidity problems. 
The paper provides some evidence consistent with this role for reinsurance. 
Insurers with greater holdings of liquid assets buy less reinsurance. Insurers 
who have more debt (and, thus, who are likely to be forced to issue costly 
equity if disaster strikes) buy more reinsurance. The need for liquidity may 
also, as the paper suggests, explain the seemingly anomalous effect of size on 
the demand for reinsurance: perhaps large insurers have a greater concern for 
liquidity, and hence purchase more reinsurance, because they have to tap fi- 
nancial markets rather than potentially more sympathetic financial institutions 
for funds (small insurers may be able to obtain the needed liquidity from their 
banks,  who are likely to be more informed  about  the extent of  losses than 
financial markets). This is worth investigating in greater detail. 
To summarize, the paper provides some valuable new evidence on the de- 
mand for reinsurance in particular and on the rationale for risk management in 
general. I am sure that it will stimulate further empirical and theoretical work 
on the subject. This Page Intentionally Left Blank